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THE WIDOW'S ELECTION TO TAKE
AGAINST A WILL*
In most jurisdictions other than the community property states a
widow is given a dower or statutory share in her husband's property
of which she cannot be deprived by her husband's will.' If the hus-
band makes a testamentary gift to his widow which is expressly in
lieu of these rights, she is put to her election. Furthermore, the ma-
jority of states have statutes to the effect that a testamentary pro-
vision for a widow is in lieu of her dower or statutory share unless a
contrary intention is manifested in the will.2 Thus, the widow must
also elect if such a contrary intention fails to appear in the will.
If a case for election exists and the widow has not been barred
from her dower or statutory share,3 she will undoubtedly elect against
,the will if she is dissatisfied with the will provisions. When the widow
so elects, there is necessarily a disruption of the testator's dispositive
plan.4 After the widow takes her share of the estate, the property re-
maining subject to the operation of the will is usually less than it would
have been. Consequently, the manner in which the remaining property
is to be disposed must be determined. The cases are rare in which a
testator, anticipating his wife's election, has made provision in his will
for the distribution of the property remaining after her share is taken,"
*This article will appear in two installments, the first discussing the situation
where a widow may elect against her husband's will, and the second taking up
the evil effects of such an election and possible remedial measures. The second
installment will appear in the summer issue of the Review.
13 VERNIER AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 351-352, 448 (1935). See section 189 of the
third volume of Vernier for a discussion of these marital property rights and
a table of state statutes concerning them. The Wisconsin statute is Section
233.14, which provides that, in the event of a widow's election against her hus-
band's will or his failure to provide for her in his will, she is to receive her
dower share under Section 233.01, i.e., a one-third part of all the lands where-
of her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the
marriage; an estate in the homeseatd for life or until remarriage; and one-
third of the husband's net personal estate.
2 3 VERNIER, supra, n. 1, at 414, 415.
3 WIs. STATS. (1953) §233.13. In general a widow may be barred by means of a
jointure or pecuniary provision, an antenuptial contract or settlement, a post-
nuptial contract or settlement, or a deed. See 3 VERNIER, supra, n. 1, §195-198,
§200. Under the Wisconsin statutes a wife may be barred of her dower and
homestead rights under Section 233.14 by joining with her husband in a con-
veyance to a third person or by executing a quitclaim deed to a third person
to whom her husband has already conveyed the property (Section 235.27), or
by doing the same through a power of attorney (Section 235.28); she may be
barred from her entire statutory share under Section 233.14 by means of a
jointure or pecuniary provision (Sections 233.09, 233.10, 233.11, 233.12, and
233.14). The next installment of this article will consider the exclusiveness of
the Wisconsin statutes on jointures and pecuniary provisions as a bar to a
widow's statutory share under Section 233.14.
See Note, Effects of Widow's Election to Take Against Will, 24 IowA L. REv.
714 (1939) for an excellent discussion of the effects of a widow's election.
5 Ibid., 24 IowA L. REv. at 719, 720.
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but where such provision is made the testator's direction is followed.6
In some jurisdictions statutes determined how the will is to operate
on the remaining property.7 In the absence of statute or an express
provision in the will regarding the method of distribution, the courts
try to carry out the provisions of the will as best they can, relying
on the presumed intention of the testator.8 However, where a statute
or the presumed intention of the testator is relied upon in determining
the distribution of the property, many difficult problems arise, and
in extreme cases the testator's will is rendered ineffective.9
It is the purpose of this article to consider; (1) the possibilities
of a widow's election under present Wisconsin law, (2) the evil effects
of such an election, and (3) the means by which these evils may be
prevented or mitigated.
I. Situations Where the Widow May Elect to Take Against
the Will
A. Where Will Gives Widow Less Than Statutory Share
Under Section 233.14
It is impracticable to generalize as to the factors which will cause
a widow's election. The nature of the will provisions, the kind and
amount of the estate assets, and the personal circumstances of the
widow are some of the most important factors, and they will of course
vary from case to case. However, it can be said that ordinarily when-
ever a widow is given less under the will than the statutory share she
is entitled to under Section 233.14 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 0 she
may decide to take against the will.
At times a testator will give his wife less than her statutory
share because of ill feeling between them, but there are many other
situations in which a husband will be disinclined to give his wife
much by will. For example, (1) the wife may have a separate estate
which is more than adequate for her needs. Perhaps the husband has
already given her a substantial share of his property by an inter
vivos transfer. (2) There may be substantial non-probate assets which
will pass to the wife at the husband's death. For instance, the hus-
6 Pittman v. Pittman, 81 Kan. 643, 107 P. 235 (1910); Kohl's Estate, 336 Pa.
376, 9 A2d 346 (1939); Mohn's Appeal, 76 Pa. 92 (1874) ; Bard's Estate, 58
Pa. 393 (1868).
77 AM. Ju. WILLS, §1549, 1055; supra, n. 4 at 726-728.8 Merchant's Nat. Bank v. Hubbard, 222 Ala. 518, 133 So. 723 (1931) ; Ward v.
Ward, 153 Kan. 222, 109 P.2d 68 (1941) ; Estate of McLean, 219 Wis. 222, 262
N.W. 707 (1935). See Notes, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 602 (1910); Ann. Cas. 1913
E 417, supp. Ann. Cas. 1918 C 413.9 Fennell v. Fennell, 80 Kan. 730, 106 P. 1038 (1909), modified, 81 Kan. 642, 106
P. 1040 (1910). See In re Estate of Hunter, 129 Neb. 529, 536, 262 N.W. 41,
44 (1935). Cf. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 3 Lans. 348, 382 (N.Y. 1870);
Sevier v. Woodson, 205 Mo. 202, 104 S.W. 1 (1907). See Notes, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 602 (1910); Ann. Cas. 1913 E 418.10 See supra, n. 1 for provisions of Section 233.14.
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band may have an insurance policy on his life which is payable to
his widow and he may have given up the right to change the ben-
eficiary. Thus, she will get the insurance proceeds as a matter of
course, unless premium payments are not met. Deeming the insurance
proceeds sufficient provision for his wife, the testator may leave her
little or nothing in his will. (3) An older man may marry after
amassing certain wealth. His wife has not aided him in the accumula-
tion of his estate, and he feels that a one-third portion of his property
is more than she is entitled to. Perhaps he has children of a former
marriage to whom he wants most of his wealth to go.
A widow may also get less under the will than her statutory share
where the husband has conveyed large amounts of realty during his
lifetime without his wife's joinder, or where his will fails to dispose
of a substantial amount of his property. If the widow takes under
the will, she is baired from her statutory share in such property as
well as in property disposed of by the will.1 However, if the widow
takes against the will, she gets her dower in all the lands of which her
husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the
marriage, 2 which lands necessarily include those conveyed by the hus-
band without his wife's joinder or otherwise undisposed of by the will.
She also takes one-third of the husband's "net personal estate,"'13
which net personal estate includes intestate personalty. Thus, if the
husband has aliened a substantial amount of realty without his wife's
joinder, or if considerable property passes intestate, it may be that the
wife's statutory share under Section 233.14 of the Wisconsin Statutes
will be greater than the benefits given her by the will.
B. Where Will Gives Widow More Than Statutory Share
Under Section 233.14
Even though the testamentary gifts to a widow are of greater
value than her statutory share, there are factors which may cause her
to elect. For instance, the widow may prefer outright interests to in-
terests for life.'4 Thus, if the will gives her a life interest in prop-
erty, which life interest will amount to more than the wife's statutory
share if she lives her life expectancy, the widow may take her statutory
share, since she then receives absolute interests in the testator's non-
homestead realty and personalty.
Another possible reason for a widow's election, notwithstanding
the fact that the will gives her more than her statutory share, may
be found where the husband dies partially intestate. Partial intestacy
'13Wis. STATs. (1953) §233.01, 233.13, 233.14; Hardy v. Scales, 54 Wis. 452, 11
N.W. 590 (1882); Chapman v. Chapman, 128 Wis. 413, 107 N.W. 668 (1906).
12WIs. STATS. (1953) §233.14, 233.01.
13 WIS. STATS. (1953) §233.14, 318.01.
141n re Will of Muskat, 224 Wis. 245, 271 N.W. 837 (1937); Will of Borchert,
259 Wis. 361, 48 N.W. 2d 496 (1951).
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may occur where a legacy or devise lapses or is void, where a resid-
uary clause is lacking or incomplete, or wherever the husband fails to
dispose of all his property by will. In any of these situations, if a
widow abides by her husband's will, the weight of authority in the
United States says that she does not share under the intestate statutes 5
in the property which passes intestate.'6 Wisconsin in the early cases
of Hardy v. Scales" and Chapman v. Chapman'8 held with the ma-
jority.' 9 On the other hand, if the widow takes under the law, there is
a strong possibility that she will participate in certain of the intestate
property as heir or next of kin in addition to receiving her statutory
share under Section 233.14, Wisconsin Statutes. (Of course, we are
assuming a case where a widow's share under the intestate statutes is
greater than her statutory share under Section 233.14.) We must dis-
tinguish between two situations. The first is where the intestate prop-
erty involved is the property which the widow has renounced, i.e.,
where it is the widow's act which has caused the partial intestacy.2 0
In this case the courts usually refuse to allow the widow to take under
the intestate statutes.2 1 Such is the holding in a recent Wisconsin de-
cision, Will of Uihlein.22 The second situation involves property
rendered intestate by means other than the widow's election. Authority
is split as to whether a widow should take such intestate property
under the intestate statutes. Some courts have denied her this right
on the ground that she has already received a share in the'entire estate
and should not be permitted to take a second time.23 Others have held
that since there is an intestacy she should be entitled to share under
the intestate statutes.24
'5 Wis. STATS. (1953), ch. 237 and §318.01.
16 Cases collected in Notes, L.R.A. 1917 D 762; Ann. Cas. 1918 B 986; 93 A.L.R.
1384 (1934). The question is treated in considerable detail by Phelps, The
Widow's Right of Election in the Estate of Her Husband, 37 MICH L. Rv.
236, 401 (1938). See Sayre, Husband and Wife as Statutory Heirs, 42 HARv.
L. REv. 330 (1929), for criticism of the majority view.
17 Hardy v. Scales, 54 Wis. 452, 11 N.W. 590 (1882).
Is Chapman v. Chapman, 128 Wis. 413, 107 N.W. 668 (1906).
'9 See Note, Partial Intestacy-The Right of a Widow to Share in the Intestate
Property of Her Husband Who Has Disposed of Less Than All of His
Property by Will, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 182, for criticism of the Wisconsin de-
cisions.
20 Ordiniarily the interest which the widow renounces is not considered intestate
property; rather, it is used to compensate disappointed beneficiaries under the
will. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 464 (5th ed. 1941). Occasionally,
however, such property is considered intestate property. Fife v. Fife, 320 III.
270, 150 N.E. 630 (1926) ; Harris v. Harris, 139 Md. 187, 114 A. 909 (1921).
Such was the holding in Will of Uihlein, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W. 2d 641 (1953),
where compensation was not required.
21 Shoup v. Shoup, 319 Ill. 179, 149 N.E. 746 (1925) ; Appeal of Sims' Estate, 162
Okla. 35, 18 P. 2d 1077 (1933).
22 264 Wis. 362, 385-389, 59 N.W. 2d 641, 653, 654 (1953).
2 3 Boynton v. Boynton, 266 Mass. 454, 165 N.E. 489 (1929).
24 Blatt v. Blatt, 79 Colo. 57, 243 Pac. 1099 (1926) ; Dale v. Bartley, 58 Ind. 101
(1877) ; Cain v. Barnwell, 124 Miss. 860, 87 So. 484 (1921).
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In the Uihlein case the Wisconsin court did not have to decide this
second situation, but the opinion is couched in very broad language
and would appear to be a holding that, when a husband dies partially
intestate, no matter for what reason, and a widow takes under the law,
she is to get no share in the intestate property as heir or next of kin,
but only her stautory share under Section 233.14. However, the impli-
cation that a widow will not take under the intestate statutes prop-
erty which passes intestate for reasons other than the widow's elec-
tion is pure dictum, since the decision in the Uihlein case is restricted
to property which became intestate because of the widow's renuncia-
tion. Of course, the language in the opinion, as strong as it is, cannot
be completely disregarded. Yet, there is a good possibility that the Wis-
consin court will allow the widow to share under the intestate statutes
when the intestate property was not rendered such by virtue of her
election, since this appears to be the better view. Certainly, there is no
valid reason to exclude her from such intestate property-any presumed
intent on the part of the testator is immaterial as to property of which
he has failed to dispose ;25 also denying the widow a share in the inte-
state property as heir or next of kin whether she takes under or
against her husband's will is analytically unsound.
Thus, if there is a substantial amount of property which is left
undisposed of by the testator's will and which is not rendered intestate
by the widow's election, it may be to the widow's advantage to elect
against the will even though her statutory share under Section 233.14
is less than what the will gives her, because of the probability that she
will also take a share in the property as heir or next of kin.
One more factor which may influence a widow to take against the
will, whether or not her statutory share is greater than the testamentary
gifts in her favor, is the question of creditors rights. If the debts of the
testator are large, it may be advisable for the widow to take under the
law. If she takes under the will, the debts of the husband may con-
sume all the personalty bequeathed to her except the widow's allow-
ance under Section 313.15,29 and all the realty devised to her27 except
for the homestead exemption of $5,000. 2s Also, this exemption may
be eaten up by taxes; laborers', mechanics' and purchase money liens ;29
or mortgages other than purchase money mortgages which are con-
251 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 733 (1952). Paul L. Sayre, in 42 HRv. L. REv.
330, Husband and Wife as Statutory Heirs (1929), contends that a widow
electing against her husband's will should not participate in intestate property
as statutory heir. However, his position is based on the premise that the
particular jurisdiction allows taking as statutory heir where the widow abides
by her husband's will.
26 SeeWis. STATS. (1953) §313.15.
27 WIS. STATS. (1953) §316.01.
28 WIS. STATS. (1953) §238.04, 237.025, 370.01(14), 27220.
29WIs. STATS. (1953) §272.20.
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sented to by the wife by means of her joinder in the mortgage or her
execution of a separate mortgage.3"
However, if the widow takes against the will, she gets substan-
tially more protection against her husband's creditors whenever the
estate includes realty. As to personalty the situation is the same as
though she took under the will, since the "net personal estate" of the
testator, of which the widow gets a one-third portion under Section
233.14, is the personalty of the husband after payment of debts.3 1 Thus,
the only personalty free from his debts is the widow's allowance under
Section 313.15, which is awarded to her whether or not the husband
dies testate. However, in regard to realty, the widow gets a great deal
more protection from estate creditors than if she took under the will.
As to homestead realty, there is a possibility that the widow may
receive her interest in the homestead entirely exempt from her
husband's debts if she takes against the will. Section 233.14
provides that the widow gets the same homestead rights as though
the testator died intestate leaving lawful issue. Section 237.02(2),
which pertains to the descent of a homestead, provides that if a de-
cedent leaves a widow and issue the homestead goes to the widow so
long as not remarried, and upon remarriage or death to the original
decedent's heirs according to Section 237.01, provided that the limita-
tion as to the value of the homestead in Section 272.20 (i.e., the $5,000
limtation) shall not apply to a widow during widowhood. 32 Conse-
quently, where the widow takes under the law, the homestead de-
scends to her free of the value limitation of Section 272.20. It is
conceivable that Section 237.02(2) also removes the $5,000 limitation
on exemption, so that the widow's homestead rights are entirely free
from her husband's debts.3 3 Of course, we must remember that this
exemption may be consumed by the lawful liens mentioned above in
discussing the exemption where the widow takes under the will. How-
ever, in a given case it may be to the widow's advantage to take under
the law even though the will gives her the homestead, since she may
get a greater exemption than the $5,000 allowed her if she takes under
the will."
30 Wis. STATS. (1953) §235.01.
31 WIS. STATS. (1953) §233.14, 313.15, 318.01 ; supra, n. 22, 264 Wis. at 376; Ford
v. Ford, 88 Wis. 122, 59 N.W. 464 (1894).
32 The proviso is a 1951 amendment (L. 1951, ch. 727 §23m). There are no de-
cisions on whether it applies to a case where a widow elects and no issue
actually survive the testator, but a literal interpretation of Sections 233.14 and
237.02(2) gives the widow her homestead rights in the entire homestead even
though no issue actually survive.33 There are no Wisconsin decisions on this point, but see Survey of 1951 Wis-
consin Legislation, 35 MARQ. L. REv. 142, 143 for a discussion of the possi-
bility of an unlimited exemption under Section 237.02(2).
34 Examples of such a case are (1) where there are no lawful liens and the
widow's homestead rights (i.e., her estate for life or until remarriage) are
[Vol. 37
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Regarding non-homestead realty, Section 233.14 gives the widow
the same dower in the testator's land as if he had died intestate.
Thus, one-third of the testator's non-homestead realty goes to the
widow free of the claims of both general and secured creditors, 3
unless the latter have mortgages given prior to the marriage, 8 pur-
chase money mortgages,37 or mortgages in which the wife had joined.38
In the event that such mortgages exist, Section 233.06 provides
that when the realty is sold to pay off the mortgage debt, the widow
gets one-third of any surplus remaining after payment of the mortgage
and expenses of the sale. Thus, where there are no mortgages superior
to the widow's dower right, or where there is a portion of the non-
homestead realty uncovered by such mortgages, it is advisable for the
widow to take against the will. If she receives anything at all by vir-
tue of her dower right, she is better off than if she goes under the
will, because, as pointed out above, abiding by the will subjects all
non-homestead realty to the claims of unsecured creditors. 39
C. Tax Considerations
It is beyond the scope of this article to go into a detailed discussion
of the tax factors involved in a widow's election, but it does not appear
that such factors in themselves will ordinarily be sufficient to cause a
widow to elect. At the state level, a Wisconsin inheritance tax is
imposed upon the widow as to property passing to her at her husband's
death, whether the property passes under the will or by virtue of her
election.40 As to the federal estate tax, Section 811 (b) of the Internal
Revenue Code, requires the inclusion in the gross estate of the full
value of the decendent's property without any deduction for the
worth more than $5000, or (2) where such liens leave untouched a portion of
the homestead's value in excess of $15,000. In the latter situation, Wis. STATS.(1953) §233.01 is applicable. This section provides that a widow is to have
her dower in the proceeds of her husband's homestead in lieu of her home-
stead rights where the -premises are sold while the widow has homestead rights
therein. However, compare Wis. STATS. (1953) §316.11(1), which Section
seems to conflict with Section 233.01 in providing that where a mortgaged
homestead is sold the widow gets her dower and homestead interests in the
proceeds.
35United States v. Ettelson, 67 F. Supp. 257 (1946), rev'd on other grounds in
United States v. Ettelson, 159 F. 2d 193 (1947) ; Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
93 Wis. 140, 66 N.W. 518 (1896) ; Cowan v. Lindsay, 30 Wis. 586 (1872).
36 Wis. STATS. (1953) §233.04.
ST WIS. STATS. (1953) §233.05.
38 WIS. STATS. (1953) §233.06.
39 However, even though the widow fails to elect against the will within the re-
quired time under Section 233.14, it is conceivable that Section 233.17, which
entitles the widow to her dower if she is deprived of a provision made for
her by will in lieu of dower, might give relief to the widow where creditors
deprive her of the provision made for her in the will. But there are no Wis-
consin cases on this point
40 WIs. STATS. (1953) §72.01 (1) provides for taxing transfers passing by will
or the intestate laws, and Wis. STATS. (1953) §7224 defines "intestate laws of
the state" as including the dower, homestead, and other statutory rights and
allowances of a widow.
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surviving widow's dower or statutory substitute. 41 If the widow
accepts a bequest or devise in lieu of dower or its statutory substitute,
the value of the property thus passing to her must be included in the
gross estate under Section 811 (a), and the amount so included may
not be diminished by deducting the value of the widow's dower or
statutory share. 4
2
However, a widow's election against the will may give her a
federal estate tax advantage where the testamentary provisions in her
favor are not set up so as to qualify for the marital deduction.43 In
such a case electing against the will decreases the federal estate tax,
since the widow's dower right in the realty and her statutory share in
the personalty qualify for the marital deduction.44 Thus, where the
widow's share of the estate must bear a portion of the federal estate
tax whether or not she takes under the will, her tax burden will be
lightened by an election against the will.
Aside from this situation, it appears that a widow's election will
give her a tax advantage only if she can thereby escape having her
share of the estate bear any burden of the federal estate tax. It was
on this theory that the Uihlein case 45 was brought to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. There the question was whether the testator's "net
personal estate," of which the wife was entitled to a one-third portion
under Section 233.14, was to be determined before or after taxes. The
court held:
"It seems to us that the words "net estate" of our statute are
clear and unambiguous and are subject to no other interpretation
than that they mean that part of the estate which remains after
payment of all charges against the entire estate. Federal estate
taxes stand in no different category than do debts or adminis-
tration expenses .. .4,
The court's holding is all the more significant in view of the fact
that the testator had specifically provided that all estate and inheritance
taxes were to be paid from the residue, and a prior Wisconsin case 7
had said that the "residue" of a testator's estate where his widow takes
against the will consists of that part of the general estate which
remains after deducting debts, specific legacies, and the widow's share.
The court in the Uihlein case stated that had the widow abided by the
will she would have taken under the residuary clause after deduction
41 See U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.14.
42 See T. D. 3319, dtd. April 5, 1922; Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Edwards,
290 F. 617 (1922); Schuette, Executrix of Estate of Harry S. Harkness v.
Bowers, 32 F.2d 817 (1929), aff'd 40 F.2d 208 (1930).
43 This situation existed in the Uihlein case.
44 INT. REV. CODE §812(e) (3) (C).
45 Will of Uihlein, supra, n. 20.46 Supra, n. 22, 264 Wis. at 376.
47 Will of Reynolds, 151 Wis. 375, 138 N.W. 1019 (1912).
[Vol. 37
COMMENTS
of the federal estate tax, and she should not be given an advantage
tax-wise by her election. 8 Yet, the real basis of the court's decision
appears in the following passage:
"In electing to take under the law she is not entitled to claim
the benefit of the provisions directing payment of federal estate
taxes out of the residue. Such clause of the will remains effec-
tive as between the recipients of specific legacies and the re-
maindermen who take the residue, but the widow's renunciation
of the will prevents such clause from being operative so as to
relieve her share from the impact of the federal estate tax.'"' 9
Thus, it is apparent that even an express direction in a will that the
widow's share is to be free from federal estate taxes will be of no
avail in the event that the widow takes her statutory share under
Section 233.14.0
Consequently, since the widow's share under Section 233.14 is not
free from the burden of the federal estate tax, there is no advantage
to her tax-wise in electing against the will. Furthermore, in cases
where she would take her share under the will tax free, there is
clearly a tax disadvantage. Under certain circumstances this dis-
advantage is especially acute, due to the fact that the widow's election
increases the federal estate tax. For example, suppose the widow is
given the income from a testamentary trust and a power of appoint-
ment over the corpus of the trust in favor of her estate, so that the
trust corpus qualifies for the marital deduction under Section 812
(e) (1) (F) of the Internal Revenue Code, and the value of this trust
corpus is determined by means of a formula, so as to qualify for the
full fifty percent (50%) of the testator's adjusted gross estate allowed
as a marital deduction. The widow, desiring the outright interests in
her husband's property which Section 233.14 affords to her instead of
the life interest given her in the will, takes under the law. As a result,
considerably less than fifty percent (50%) of the adjusted gross
qualifies for the marital deduction.5 ' Consequently, the federal estate
tax is greater than if the widow had taken under the will, and the
widow's share is subject to an even greater tax -burden than would
ordinarily result from her election.
WILiAm A. GIGuRE
4 8 Supra, n. 22, 264 Wis. at 377.
49 Supra, n. 22, 264 Wis. at 377, 378.
50 Note that the holding in the Uihlein case is restricted to a situation where the
testator leaves sufficient personalty to pay the federal estate tax. There is no
Wisconsin decision as to a case where personalty is insufficient.
51 Only one-third of the non-homestead realty and one-third of the net personal
estate, i.e., the widow's dower and her statutory share in the personalty under
Section 233.14, qualify for the marital deduction. INTr. REv. CoDE, §812(e) (3)(C). The widow's homestead rights, ice., her estate in the homestead for life
or until remarriage, do not qualify because of the terminable interest rule.
IxT. REv. CODE, §812(e) (1) (B).
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